Development of the DF-5 began in 1966. After successful testing throughout the 1970s, the DF-5 completed its first full test flight in May 1980. The missiles entered service in 1981 and were deployed in hardened silos in central China. The DF-5 has an effective range of 12,000 km and delivers a payload of 3,900 kg. This payload is equipped with a 1 to 3 MT yield nuclear warhead. It is reported to also be equipped with chaff and decoys or penetration aids to increase its resilience to missile defense systems. PLARF came up the DF-5A in the mid-1990s with improved range (>13,000 km) and DF-5B in 2015 capable of carrying 3 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) nuclear warheads that can each individually strike a different target. This was followed by the DF-5C variant in 2017 equipped with 10 MIRVed warheads.[9] While powerful, the DF-5A/B/C uses liquid fueled engines, requiring a lengthy (up to 2 hour) fueling process before launch, making it vulnerable to a first-strike attack. [10]

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The DF-11 is a road-mobile, nuclear-capable, solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) can reach ranges up to 800km. While the DF-11 has an estimated accuracy of 200m CEP, the PRC is reportedly working to increase its accuracy to 30 CEP by 2020 through the addition of Global Positioning System (GPS) and laser guidance systems.[11]

The DF-15 family offers a variety of strategic implications for China. Tested heavily during the 1995/1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, it is apparent that the DF-15 missiles are often used as a deterrent against Taiwan seeking independence. DF-15C was originally designed with the intention of destroying the Heng Shan Military Command Center in Taiwan's capital of Taipei, which was built to withstand a 20 kiloton nuclear blast, a 2 kiloton conventional bomb blast, or an electromagnetic pulse; another target would be Chiashan Air Force Base.[12] According to one estimate by the RAND Corporation, the PRC’s DF-15 stockpile alone is nearly double the size needed to eliminate Taiwan’s attack aircraft infrastructure. The extended range on the DF-15A allows China to expand their strike range beyond Taiwan, reaching as far as South Korea and parts of northern India. Depending on where it is deployed, the DF-15B can reach Kadena Air Base in Japan as well as New Delhi, India. The DF-15 family is therefore a versatile component of the PRC’s rapid attack and anti-access/area denial capabilities.[13]

Along with the DF-11, the DF-15 provides the PRC with a plausible theater nuclear capability. Should the PRC successfully update its SRBM arsenal with more sophisticated guidance systems, this capability will become all the more formidable.

The DF-16 is one of China’s most accurate missiles, with enough accuracy to hit slowly moving targets. Its range of 1,000 km fills the gap that previously existed with the absence of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in the PLA's arsenal. It is designed to pose a challenge to foreign military installations along the first island chain, which is what the Chinese military calls the series of islands that stretch from Japan in the north to Taiwan and the Philippines to the south.[14] The DF-16 and the longer range DF-21 ballistic missiles are believed to be stationed at the same base and can cover all targets within Japan and the Pacific first island chain stretching from the Kuril islands just south of the Kamchatka peninsula in Russia all the way to Borneo and the Malay peninsula.[15]

Most of DF-11, DF-12, DF-15, and DF-16 are deployed against India and Taiwan, with those deployed in Taiwan's direction not nuclear-armed. The overall strategy of China's military industrial complex has been the development of large numbers of missile systems. "Their tactical missiles may not be perfect, but they are banking on numbers – even if enemy air and missile defenses take some of them down, some will still make it through to their targets." The numbers of DF-11s and DF-15s China has deployed could actually range in the thousands.[16]

The DF-16 is not the only relatively new missile that the US and its allies must worry about. China recently tested a new ballistic missile, the DF-17 MRMB capable of carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that can be deployed from a ballistic missile upon its re-entry on a flight path much different from that of the ballistic missile carrying it. The HGV can then glide as far as 1,400 km to its target at extremely high speeds, at relatively low altitudes and on difficult-to-predict trajectories. The HGV may also have maneuverable characteristics during its terminal phase. This makes it difficult for either antiballistic-missile defense systems or traditional surface-to-air missile systems to defeat the weapons on approach.[17]

DF-21 is China’s first road-mobile, solid propellant MRBM developed in 1991. It is a variant of the JL-1 submarine-launched system that replaced the DF-2 in the early 1980s.[18] Unlike the DF-11, DF-12, DF-15, and DF-16, which are mostly SRBM, the DF-21s family comprises of highly accurate conventional and nuclear capable MRBMs with a maximum range of 2,150 km.

• Conventionally-armed DF-21s greatly strengthen China’s A2/AD capabilities by allowing the PLA to engage in theater-range ballistic missile opening or escalating strikes meant to counteract an adversary’s invading forces and infrastructures. Their range, speed and accuracy made them ideal for holding US Navy platforms and their supporting assets at risk in the near seas and their approaches within the first island chain.[19] This would allow China to perform long-range preemptive, opportunistic, or suppressive, strikes that can interfere with adversaries attempting to assemble for an operation. The MaRV DF-21D with CEP of 20 m and top speed of Mach 10, for example, is particularly lethal and has been branded a “carrier killer”.

• The nuclear-armed DF-21s, on the other hand act as an additional deterrent to other regional adversaries such as Japan, Korea, Russia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

To reach the second island chain, PLARF uses the intermediate range continental missiles (IRBMs) such as the DF-26 which is capable of conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets and conventional strikes against naval targets in the western Pacific Ocean.[20]  Fielded only in 2016, it is thus China's first conventionally-armed ballistic missile capable of reaching Guam, a major hub for the Pentagon’s shift of U.S. forces to Asia Pacific. This has led to the missile being referred to by netizens as the "Guam Express" or "Guam Killer". The DF-26 is thus a critical component of PLA’s military buildup aimed at controlling the Asia-Pacific waters and preventing the US military entry to the two island chains along China’s coasts.[21] To be sure, China has been able to reach Guam with nuclear weapons for decades. For example, the nuclear-armed DF-4 deployed in the 1970s was likely targeted at Guam. But in terms of lethality, DF-4 is nowhere near the DF-26 which is equipped with manoeuvrable and hypersonic warhead.

Finally, for a global reach, PLARF has the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) family that can reach a maximum range of 11,700 km and the soon-to-be-deployed DF-41 ICBM with a maximum range of 15,000 km. The DF-31 and DF-31A ICBM can be launched either on road or rail. DF-31B, on the other hand, can be launched from new all-terrain TELs. The capability to be driven off-road offers more stealth. To top it off, DF-31A/B are also able MIRV capable making them harder to be intercepted.  The real game-changer is DF-41 which some called China’s “ultimate doomsday weapon” that can potentially wreak extensive destruction. When deployed, DF-41 will be the world’s longest range missile capable of carrying not only conventional/nuclear warheads but also HGVs. With a hypersonic speed of Mach 25, it is capable of delivering up to 10 MIRVed warheads and can strike the continental US within 30 minutes. Moreover, China is loading DF-41 with manoeuvring re-entry vehicles (MARVs) that would give them the ability to further defeat US missile defence, and potentially, attack different targets including mobile ones at the same time.[22]

As for delivery by submarine, PLAN’s JIN-class (Type 094) each carries twelve JL-2 SLBM (Julang-2 巨浪2) with an estimated range of 8,000 – 9,000 km. The JL-2 is a naval variant of the land-based DF-31. It is capable of carrying either 3 – 8 MIRV (90kT each) or a single warhead with a yield of 250-1000 kT over a range of 8,000km. Together, the four JIN-class SSBNs are supposed to give the PLAN its first credible long-range sea-based nuclear capability. Moreover, PLAN is reported to be developing a fourth-generation the Type 096 SSBN each to be equipped with 24 third-generation nuclear armed intercontinental SLBMs, the JL-3.[23]

Notably, there is no talk by PLAAF about fielding air-launched nuclear missiles even though H-6, or for that matter, PLARF’s other bombers are nuclear capable. There are reportedly also no nuclear aerial bombs in the China's nuclear stockpile.[24] This may be because China has a nuclear "No First Use" policy. It is thus oriented towards defensive use of nuclear weapons, a strategy that prioritizes platforms that are more likely to survive an adversary’s nuclear first strike, such as ground-based and submarine-launched strategic missiles and not bombers which are more vulnerable to surprise attack in the air.[25]

In addition to ballistic missiles, China also invests in its cruise missile programs and is currently developing and testing several different models of advanced land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) that are capable of standoff, precision strikes.